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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case arises from a now-defunct Ponzi scheme.  
The defendants are MB Investment Partners, Inc. (“MB”), a 
registered investment adviser, and various persons affiliated 
with MB.  The fraudulent scheme was perpetrated by Mark 
Bloom while he was an employee and officer of MB, through 
a hedge fund called North Hills, L.P. (“North Hills”) that 
Bloom controlled and managed outside the scope of his 
responsibilities at MB.  Bloom was arrested and indicted in 
the Southern District of New York in 2009 on a variety of 
charges relating to the Ponzi scheme, by which time most of 
the money invested in North Hills was gone.  Plaintiffs 
Barry J. Belmont, Philadelphia Financial Services LLC 
(“PFS”),1
 
 Thomas J. Kelly, Jr. and his wife Frances R. Kelly, 
and Gary O. Perez (collectively, the “Investors”) brought suit 
in the Unites States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania against MB, certain of its officers and directors, 
including Bloom, and one of its employees, Robert L. 
Altman, in an effort to recover money they had lost at the 
hands of Bloom. 
The Investors offered various theories of liability 
under both federal and state law, alleging  (1) controlling 
person liability under Section 20(a) of the Securities and 
                                              
1 PFS is a Pennsylvania limited liability company that 
serves as the personal investment vehicle for its sole member, 
John F. Wallace. 
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Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”), (2) negligent 
supervision, (3) violations of Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b-5, (4) violations of the 
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection 
Law (the “UTPCPL”), and (5) breach of fiduciary duty.  The 
District Court dismissed all of the claims against Altman and, 
following discovery, granted summary judgment to all of the 
remaining defendants on all of the Investors’ claims.   For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm in part and vacate in part 
the District Court’s orders and will remand the case for a trial 
on the Investors’ claims against MB for violations of Rule 
10b-5 and the UTPCPL.  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Facts2
 
 
1. The Parties 
 
 Defendant MB is a registered investment adviser 
previously known as Munn Bernhard & Associates, Inc.  It is 
based in New York and registered to do business in 
Pennsylvania.  As a registered investment adviser, MB 
managed client investments by trading securities on stock 
                                              
2 In accordance with our standard of review, see infra 
note 17, we set forth the facts in the light most favorable to 
the Investors.  See Funk v. CIGNA Grp. Ins., 648 F.3d 182, 
190 (3d. Cir. 2011) (“Summary judgment is proper if there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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exchanges through custodial trading accounts held by third 
parties, such as Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.  MB’s primary 
investment focus was on large-capitalization stocks.  It ceased 
operations in June 2009, following the discovery of the North 
Hills fraud and Bloom’s arrest.     
 
  Defendants Robert Machinist and Robert L. Altman 
(together with MB, the “MB Defendants”) were executives 
working at MB during the period that Mark Bloom also 
worked there.  Machinist was the chairman of MB’s board of 
directors, and the chief operating officer and a co-managing 
partner of MB,3 and he owned 14 percent of the capital stock 
of its parent company, Centre MB Holdings, LLC (“CMB”).  
Machinist was listed as a “control person”4 in MB’s Form 
ADV, the reporting form used by investment advisers to 
register with both the SEC and state securities authorities.  
Altman was a senior managing director,5
                                              
3 Although Machinist, Altman and Bloom held the 
titles of “partner,” MB was a New York corporation rather 
than a partnership at all times relevant to this dispute.  
 partner, and 
portfolio manager of MB.  Bloom was also an executive at 
MB, serving as president, co-managing partner (with 
Machinist), and chief marketing officer, and he too owned 14 
4 The term “control” in Form ADV is defined as “the 
power, directly or indirectly, to direct the management or 
policies of a person, whether through ownership of securities, 
by contract, or otherwise.”  (App. at 1130.)   
5 Altman held the title of “director” as a member of 
MB’s senior management team but was not a member of 
MB’s board of directors.  
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percent of the capital stock of CMB.  Bloom was also a 
member of MB’s board of directors.6
 
   
 Defendant Centre Partners Management, LLC 
(“Centre Partners”) is a Delaware limited liability company 
that provides advisory and management services for various 
private equity investment funds, each of which is structured 
as a limited partnership composed primarily of investors 
otherwise unaffiliated with Centre Partners.  Defendants 
Lester Pollack, William M. Tomai, and Guillaume Bébéar 
(together with Centre Partners and CMB, the “Centre 
Defendants”) are Centre Partners executives.  Pollack, Tomai, 
and Bébéar were, at all times relevant to this dispute, non-
management members of MB’s board of directors, with no 
role in the business’s day-to-day operations, and they do not 
appear on MB’s organizational chart.  However, Pollack and 
Tomai are listed as control persons on MB’s Form ADV.   
 
 Defendant CMB is a Delaware limited liability 
company formed by Centre Partners, Machinist, and Bloom 
to acquire a controlling interest in MB.  In July 2004, 
Machinist, Bloom, and Centre Partners (though an affiliated 
fund) invested $14 million in CMB for the acquisition of MB, 
with Centre Partners as the largest shareholder, followed by 
Machinist and Bloom.  CMB owned 57 percent of the capital 
stock of MB, and controlled the operations of MB through a 
contractual operating agreement.  CMB is denominated as a 
control person on MB’s Form ADV.  After CMB acquired 
                                              
6 Although Bloom was named as a defendant in the 
Complaint, the District Court entered a default judgment 
against him for failure to appear, plead, or otherwise defend, 
and he is not a party to this appeal.   
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control of MB, it designated Bloom, Machinist, Pollack, 
Tomai, and Bébéar to serve as members of the MB board of 
directors.   
 
 Defendants P. Benjamin Grosscup, Thomas N. Barr, 
Christine Munn, and Robert A. Bernhard (together with 
Machinist, Bloom, Pollack, Tomai, and Bébéar, the “MB 
Directors”) were all MB executives who also served as 
members of the MB board of directors.  Grosscup, Barr, and 
Munn are listed as “control persons” in MB’s Form ADV.7
 
   
 Plaintiffs, the Investors, all had money in Bloom’s 
North Hills fund, investing a total of approximately $4.4 
million in North Hills from 2006 to 2008.  Belmont and the 
Kellys were also MB clients and entered into advisory 
agreements with MB.  PFS and Perez did not have any 
advisory agreement with MB. 
 
2. Bloom and the North Hills Ponzi Scheme 
 
 Bloom worked as a certified public accountant in the 
tax department of an accounting firm from 1979 to 1992.  
From 1992 to 2001, he worked for a hedge fund management 
company where he was responsible for marketing and client 
                                              
7 Bernhard is not listed as a control person because he 
ended his employment and resigned from the MB board of 
directors in connection with the July 2004 purchase of MB by 
CMB, although he continued to serve as an outside consultant 
to the company.  Although CMB held majority voting control 
of MB, the minority shareholders were entitled to designate 
three directors under the terms of the company’s Operating 
Agreement.  Those directors were Grosscup, Barr, and Munn. 
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services.  Bloom left the hedge fund in 2001, and became 
president of a registered investment adviser and broker-dealer 
affiliated with his former accounting firm.  He resigned from 
that position and  joined MB prior to the July 2004 
acquisition of MB by CMB.   
 
 Bloom formed North Hills in 1997, as an enhanced 
stock index fund based on various stock indices.  Bloom was 
the sole principal and managing member of North Hills 
Management, LLC, the general partner of North Hills, and he 
had sole authority over the selection of the fund’s 
investments.  Although North Hills was founded as a stock 
index fund, Bloom later described North Hills to investors as 
a “fund of funds” that invested in hedge funds and other well-
managed funds and that provided financing to the widely-
known retailer Costco.  Between 2001 and 2007, Bloom 
raised approximately $30 million from 40 to 50 investors for 
the North Hills fund.  He claimed that North Hills 
consistently generated investment returns of 10-15 percent 
per year without significant risk.  
 
 In fact, however, North Hills was a Ponzi scheme that 
Bloom used to finance his lavish personal lifestyle, and, over 
time, he diverted at least $20 million from North Hills for his 
own personal use.  Bloom used those funds to acquire 
multiple apartments and homes, furnishings, luxury cars and 
boats, and jewelry, and to fund parties and travel.   
 
 Bloom also engaged in self-dealing beyond the money 
he converted from North Hills.  For example, while acting as 
a third-party marketer for the Philadelphia Alternative Asset 
Fund (“PAAF’), he invested $17 million of North Hills’s 
funds in PAAF, earning a lucrative commission for himself 
10 
 
without disclosing that conflict of interest to North Hills 
investors.  When PAAF, and another company in which 
North Hills had invested, the futures and commodities broker 
Refco, Inc., collapsed due to separate frauds, Bloom 
misappropriated proceeds of legal settlements and residual 
payments made to North Hills as an unsecured creditor.   
 
3. Marketing of North Hills to the Investors 
 
 In June 2006, Bloom met with plaintiff Belmont to 
introduce himself and to discuss the investment advisory 
services offered by MB.  Bloom gave Belmont his MB 
business card and described the investment philosophy of 
MB.  Bloom then discussed various investment funds, 
including North Hills, that he recommended as suitable for 
Belmont, supposedly based on Belmont’s objectives.   
 
 In July 2006, John Wallace (the sole principal of 
plaintiff PFS) and Belmont met with Bloom and Altman.  
Altman repeated Bloom’s praise for North Hills, and he 
suggested that MB’s access to North Hills was a selling point 
for MB’s advisory services.8  Bloom and Altman presented 
Belmont with a proposed asset allocation that they had 
prepared on MB’s letterhead.9
                                              
8 Altman disputes that account of the meeting.  He 
testified that he never commented on North Hills as an 
investment and that he did not say that access to North Hills 
was a selling point for MB.   
  Both Belmont and PFS 
9 The Investors contend that the proposed asset 
allocation “recommend[ed] that Belmont invest 20% of the 
funds he entrusted to MB in North Hills.”  (Appellants’ 
Opening Br. at 7 (citing App. at 955).)  However, the exhibit 
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subsequently invested in North Hills.  Belmont also became 
an investment advisory client of MB, with Altman serving as 
Belmont’s portfolio manager and Bloom serving as his 
relationship manager.  In February 2008, allegedly on 
Altman’s advice, Belmont transferred $1 million from his 
MB-managed Charles Schwab account to North Hills, adding 
it to money he had already invested in that fund.10
 
  
 Altman also served as portfolio manager for Thomas 
and Frances Kelly.  He marketed North Hills to the Kellys as 
an investment option available through MB.11
 
   
 Perez had no formal relationship with MB.  He had, 
however, previously met Bloom and, in the fall of 2008, he 
telephoned him at MB’s offices, seeking investment advice.  
Bloom recommended that Perez invest in North Hills.   
                                                                                                     
to which the Investors refer does not mention North Hills by 
name, and the asset allocation at issue is simply labeled 
“Credit Arbitrage.”  (See id.)   
10 Altman disputes that account of the $1 million 
transfer.  Altman testified that, when Belmont told him that 
he was nervous about the stock market in early 2008, Altman 
advised him concerning various money market investment 
options.  Altman also testified that the direction to transfer the 
funds from the MB-managed Schwab account to North Hills 
was relayed to him by Bloom.     
11 Altman contends that he did not market North Hills 
to the Kellys.  He says that he was not their portfolio manager 
and that the Kellys ultimately signed some 13 separate 
advisory agreements for different MB products, none of 
which was North Hills. 
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4. The Defendants’ Roles with Respect to 
 MB and North Hills 
 
 Bloom operated North Hills the entire time that he was 
an executive of MB, until his arrest in February 2009.  
Although the business address for North Hills was one of 
Bloom’s residences in Manhattan, he made no attempt, while 
working at MB, to conceal his activities related to North 
Hills.  Investments in North Hills were administered by 
Bloom and other MB personnel, using MB’s offices, 
computers, filing facilities, and office equipment.  MB 
support staff sometimes carried out tasks related to North 
Hills.  
 
 MB officers and directors were aware that Bloom was 
operating North Hills while he was also working as an 
investment adviser at MB.  As a result of financial dealings 
with North Hills beginning in 2004, Machinist was familiar 
with Bloom’s control over North Hills.  Machinist 
participated in a  number of business ventures with North 
Hills, including North Hills’s investment in a company called 
DOBI Medical International Inc. (“DOBI”).  Machinist also 
attended meetings in which Bloom marketed North Hills and 
described it as an MB fund.  Machinist’s successor as MB’s 
CEO, Michael Jamison, was also aware of North Hills, and, 
in December 2007, transferred funds to North Hills 
Management, the general partner of North Hills, as part of a 
personal loan to Bloom.  Bloom’s position at North Hills was 
also disclosed in a 2005 prospectus of DOBI, in connection 
with North Hills’s investment in the stock of that company, 
and defendants Machinist, Grosscup, Barr, Bernhard, and 
Munn were investors in DOBI and had access to the 
prospectus.       
13 
 
 As an investment adviser, MB was required by the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”), and 
by Rules promulgated under the Advisers Act, and by the 
Pennsylvania Securities Act to supervise its personnel so as to 
prevent violations of the Advisers Act.12  However, during 
the period of the North Hills fraud, MB did not have in place 
basic compliance procedures employed throughout the 
investment advising industry to identify and prevent fraud 
and self-dealing by MB employees and affiliates.   
Compliance weaknesses permitted Bloom to avoid required 
disclosures to MB about North Hills as a personal investment 
vehicle.  MB officers and directors failed to make basic 
inquiries about Bloom’s operation of North Hills, and did not 
collect any information on North Hills or monitor sales of 
investments in North Hills to MB’s own customers.13
                                              
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (allowing the SEC to 
censure, or suspend or deny the registration of, an investment 
adviser, where such adviser “or any person associated with 
such investment adviser” violates the federal securities laws); 
Rule 204A-1, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1 (requiring an 
investment adviser to establish a code of ethics to ensure that 
employees comply with the federal securities laws); Rule 
206(4)-7(a), 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7(a) (requiring an 
investment adviser to establish compliance policies and 
procedures to ensure compliance with the securities laws); 70 
Pa.  Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1-102(j) (defining investment adviser 
for state law purposes); id. § 1-305(a)(v) (authorizing the 
suspension or revocation of the Pennsylvania registration of 
an investment adviser that fails to comply with the federal 
securities laws including the Advisers Act).     
       
13 MB disputes these characterizations of its oversight, 
arguing that it did have in place written compliance policies 
14 
 
 The Centre Defendants were also aware of North Hills 
as a result of a due diligence investigation that the firm 
conducted on Bloom in relation to his personal investment in 
a fund managed by Centre Partners.  The Centre Defendants 
believed that North Hills was Bloom’s “family investment 
vehicle” (App. at A515), and that it was “not an actual 
business” (App. at 528).  The background report that the 
Centre Defendants obtained on Bloom stated that Bloom was 
the “sole proprietor of North Hills Management, LLC, which 
manages the investment partnership North Hills LP,” and that 
Bloom “work[ed] approximately eight hours per month for 
this fund of funds overseeing asset allocation and reporting 
performance.”14
                                                                                                     
and procedures.  As part of MB’s compliance program, 
employees (including Bloom) were required to provide 
annual certifications listing all of the securities they owned, 
and were prohibited from managing accounts for third parties 
who were not MB clients.  MB places the blame on Bloom 
and contends that, while Bloom provided those annual 
certifications, he “falsely and misleadingly omitted his 
ownership or operation of North Hills.” (MB Defendants’ Br. 
at 7-8).  Bloom did omit any reference to North Hills or any 
other trading accounts in his annual certifications to MB. 
However, shortly after Bloom was arrested, the SEC 
investigated MB and issued a deficiency letter detailing 
compliance failures. 
  (App. at 946.)  Tomai and Bébéar were also 
14 The Centre Defendants contend that the facts set 
forth in the background check were “consistent with [their] 
understanding of North Hills as Mr. Bloom’s family, or 
personal investment vehicle.”  (Centre Defendants’ Br. at 19 
(citing App. at 2621-23).) 
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aware of North Hills, and of Bloom’s control and operation of 
the fund, based on an investor questionnaire Bloom 
completed prior making his personal investment in the Centre 
Partners fund.        
 
5. The Downfall of Bloom and MB 
 
 Ironically, losses suffered by North Hills because of 
the PAAF and Refco frauds ultimately led to the collapse of 
the North Hills fraud.  In 2008, after Bloom was forced to 
disclose those losses, two large investors in North Hills 
requested a full redemption of their investments.  By that 
time, most of the money that had been invested in North Hills 
was gone, and Bloom could only return a portion of those 
investors’ funds.  It is not clear from the record in this case 
when federal authorities began to investigate Bloom, but he 
was arrested on February 25, 2009, and he was terminated by 
MB that same day.  On July 30, 2009, the U.S. Attorney for 
the Southern District of New York filed an Information 
against Bloom that documented in detail a wide-ranging 
scheme to defraud North Hills investors, beginning in 2001, 
as well as Bloom’s sale of illegal tax shelters while he was 
still practicing as an accountant.   
 
 Bloom promptly pleaded guilty to all of the counts in 
the Information, including charges that he had diverted at 
least $20 million from the operating account of North Hills 
for his own use, had misrepresented the value of North Hills 
investors’ capital accounts in their monthly statements, had 
solicited funds from new North Hills investors in 2007 and 
2008 to honor redemption requests from prior North Hills 
investors, had committed securities fraud in connection with 
the sale of interests in North Hills, and had committed mail 
16 
 
and wire fraud and laundered money invested in North Hills.  
Bloom is still the subject of a number of criminal and civil 
proceedings brought by the United States and by North Hills 
investors.15
 
   
 After the North Hills fraud was exposed, MB, which 
had been losing money and was already in some financial 
distress, was forced to cease operations in June 2009.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
 The Investors filed their original Complaint in this 
action on October 28, 2009.  They filed an Amended 
Complaint on March 30, 2010, alleging (1) securities fraud in 
violation of Rule 10b-5 on the part of Bloom, Altman, and 
MB, (2) violation of the Pennsylvania UTPCPL by Bloom, 
Altman, and MB, (3) breach of fiduciary duty by Bloom, 
Altman, and MB, (4) controlling person liability under 
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against the MB Directors, 
and (5) negligent supervision against the MB Directors.   
 
 On April 13, 2010, Defendants filed motions to 
dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rules 12(b)(6) and 
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the 
                                              
15 See U.S. Commodity Future Trading Comm’n v. 
Bloom, Civ. A. No. 09-1751 (S.D.N.Y); United States v. 
Bloom, Crim. A. No. 09-MAG-501 (S.D.N.Y); In re North 
Hills, L.P., No. 09-13035-AJG (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.); Alexander 
Dawson Found. v. Bloom, Index No. 603590/08 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct.).  Appellees are not parties to those proceedings, and the 
Investors state that those proceedings do not involve the 
issues raised in this appeal.   
17 
 
Investors had failed to state a claim and had not pled the 
elements of fraud with the required particularity.  On June 10, 
2010, the District Court dismissed all of the Investors’ claims 
against Altman.  However, the Court denied all of the other 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss.   
 
 On October 31, 2011, following discovery and an 
unsuccessful attempt at settlement, the MB Defendants 
(excluding Altman), the Centre Defendants, and the MB 
Directors filed motions for summary judgment.  On January 
5, 2012, the District Court granted summary judgment to all 
of the remaining Defendants, with the exception of Bloom, on 
all of the Investors’ claims.  Because Bloom had previously 
failed to appear, plead, or otherwise defend, the Court gave 
the Investors leave to move for default judgment against him, 
which they did.  On February 17, 2012, the Court entered a 
default judgment against Bloom and in favor of the Investors 
in the amount of approximately $5.7 million.   
 
 The June 10, 2010 dismissal of Altman and the 
January 5, 2012 grant of summary judgment to the other 
Defendants became final upon the entry of the default 
judgment against Bloom.  This timely appeal followed.16
 
   
                                              
16 Investors appeal both that portion of the June 10, 
2010 Order granting Altman’s motion to dismiss and the 
January 5, 2012 Order granting the motions for summary 
judgment by the MB Defendants, the Centre Defendants, and 
Grosscup, Barr, Munn, and Bernhard.   
18 
 
II. DISCUSSION17
                                              
 17 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. §§ 77u, 78aa, and 
supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  
The District Court alternatively had jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), because there was complete diversity 
of citizenship – the Investors are all citizens of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Defendants are all 
citizens of the State of New York – and the amount in 
controversy exceeds $75,000. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 Our review of a district court’s order granting a motion 
to dismiss is plenary.  Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Operations, 653 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2011).  
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”  Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 We also exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Howley v. Mellon Fin. 
Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 2010).  “[S]ummary 
judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving person is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A factual dispute is genuine “if the 
19 
 
The Investors press on appeal all of the theories of 
liability they argued before the District Court.   First, they 
contend that the MB Directors and the Centre Defendants are 
liable for the North Hills fraud as “controlling persons” under 
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and that the MB Directors 
are also liable under common law principles of negligent 
supervision.  Second, they argue that Altman is directly liable 
for securities fraud, under both Rule 10b-5 and the 
Pennsylvania UTPCPL, and that Altman’s and Bloom’s Rule 
10b-5 and UTPCPL violations should be imputed to MB. 
Third, they argue that Altman and MB are liable for breach of 
fiduciary duty.  We address each of those theories of liability 
in turn. 
 
A. Claims Against The MB Directors And The  
  Centre Defendants18
 
 
                                                                                                     
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 
for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
18 We note at the outset that Bernhard was entitled to 
summary judgment on those claims because he resigned as 
both an employee and director, and became a consultant, at 
the closing of the acquisition of MB by Centre Partners 
(through CMB), Machinist, and Bloom in July 2004.  
Bernhard was therefore neither an officer nor a director of 
MB, and thus was not in any position of “control” or 
“supervision” over either Bloom or MB, during the relevant 
timeframe.  See supra note 7.  We therefore affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Bernhard on 
that basis. 
20 
 
1. Section 20(a) Controlling Person Claim 
 Against the MB Directors and the  Centre 
 Defendants 
 The District Court granted summary judgment to the 
MB Directors and the Centre Defendants on the Investors’ 
controlling person claim, finding no evidence of “culpable 
participation” by those defendants in the North Hills fraud, 
either in the form of active participation or intentional 
inaction.  (App. at 13-14.)  The Investors argue that the 
“reckless failure” of the MB Directors and the Centre 
Defendants to monitor Bloom’s activities made them 
“culpable participants” in Bloom’s fraud.  (Appellants’ 
Opening Br. at 36.) 
 
 Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provides that 
 
[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, 
controls any person liable under any provision 
of this chapter or of any rule or regulation 
thereunder shall also be liable jointly and 
severally with and to the same extent as such 
controlled person to any person to whom such 
controlled person is liable ... , unless the 
controlling person acted in good faith and did 
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts 
constituting the violation or cause of action. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).19
                                              
19 Although § 20(a) governs the Investors’ “controlling 
person” claims, we have said that “§ 20(b), not § 20(a), 
defines the general standard of lawfulness to which a 
  Section 20(a) thus opens the possibility 
of making “controlling persons jointly and severally liable 
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with the controlled person” for violations of the Exchange 
Act.  In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 262, 275 
(3d Cir. 2005).  “Under the plain language of the statute, 
plaintiffs must prove not only that one person controlled 
another person, but also that the ‘controlled person’ is liable 
under the [Exchange] Act.”  In re Alpharma Sec. Litig., 372 
F.3d 137, 153 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).   
 
 In addition to the statutory elements of controlling 
person liability, we have also held that, in order for secondary 
liability to attach under § 20(a),  the defendant “must have 
been a ‘culpable participant’ in the ‘act or acts constituting 
the violation or cause of action.’”20
                                                                                                     
controlling person must conform.”  SEC v. J.W. Barclay & 
Co., 442 F.3d 834, 844 n.14 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing  SEC v. 
Coffey 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974)).  Section 20(b) 
provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful 
for such person to do under the provisions of this chapter or 
any rule or regulation thereunder through or by means of any 
other person.”  15 U.S.C. § 78t(b). 
  SEC v. J.W. Barclay & 
20  We derived that requirement from the legislative 
history of § 20(a), comparing an “insurer’s liability” standard 
proposed by the Senate, with the “fiduciary standard” 
proposed by the House and ultimately adopted in the text of § 
20(a).  We thus determined that Congress did not intend for 
controlling persons to be the “insurer against the fraudulent 
activities of another,” but rather that “what Congress did 
intend was to impose liability on those who were controlling 
persons and who were in some meaningful sense culpable 
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Co., 442 F.3d 834, 841 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Rochez 
Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889-90 (3d Cir. 1975)); 
see also Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 185 (3d 
Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by In re Data Access 
Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“One 
element of any case imposing liability under § 20(a) is 
‘culpable participation’ in the securities violation.”).  
Examples of such culpable participation include an 
executive’s transfer of assets to himself so that the brokerage 
firm he controlled would be unable to pay a penalty to the 
SEC, see J.W. Barclay & Co., 442 F.3d  at 841 n.8, and a 
broker-dealer’s “active participation” in a scheme to induce 
investors to purchase stock in an insolvent company in which 
the role of the broker-dealer and its sole shareholder “was not 
merely that of a facade for fraud but rather one of a culpable 
                                                                                                     
participants in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled 
persons.”  Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885 
(3d Cir. 1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Notwithstanding our articulation of that culpable participation 
requirement, a difference of opinion has emerged among 
district courts of this Circuit as to the pleading requirements 
for a § 20(a) claim.  Compare In re Able Labs. Sec. Litig., No. 
05-2681, 2008 WL 1967509, at *29 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2008) 
(“[T]he Third Circuit does not require that culpable 
participation be pled in order to establish controlling person 
liability.”), with In re Nice Sys., Ltd. Sec. Litig., 135 F. Supp. 
2d 551, 588 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting that culpable participation 
is an element of a § 20(a) claim when deciding a motion to 
dismiss).  Because we hold that the Investors have failed to 
satisfy the culpable participation requirement for purposes of 
summary judgment, we need not, and do not, resolve the 
pleading issue at this time. 
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confederate,” Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591, 
596 (3d Cir. 1976).  
 
 The Investors point to no acts by the MB Directors in 
furtherance of the North Hills fraud, but rather seek to 
proceed on a theory of inaction.  “To impose secondary 
liability on a controlling person for his inaction, the plaintiff 
must prove that the inaction ‘was deliberate and done 
intentionally to further the fraud.’”  Sharp, 649 F.2d at 185 
(quoting Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 890).  The Investors 
contend that culpable participation “may be premised on 
inaction[] ... if it is apparent that the inaction intentionally 
furthered the fraud or prevented its discovery.”  (Appellants’ 
Opening Br. at 37 (quoting Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 890 
(emphasis added in quotation) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).)  The Investors thus appear to suggest that any 
inaction that prevented the discovery of the fraud is sufficient 
for culpable participation.   
 
However, it is clear from Rochez Brothers that the 
requirement that the inaction be intentional applies both to 
furthering the fraud and to preventing its discovery, and that 
knowledge of the underlying fraud is required in either case.  
“[I]naction alone cannot be a basis for liability,” Rochez 
Bros., 527 F.2d at 890, and a § 20(a) claim based on inaction 
fails if the controlling person “had no knowledge of [the 
controlled person’s] fraudulent acts and did not consciously 
intend to aid” the controlled person, id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Culpable participation requires knowledge 
because, “[i]n order to be a participant, the defendant must 
have some actual knowledge of the fraudulent activity taking 
place or knowledge must be imputed to him or her… .”  
Poptech, L.P. v. Stewardship Credit Arbitrage Fund, LLC, 
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792 F. Supp. 2d 328, 341 (D. Conn. 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also id. (noting also that “knowledge is a 
first step in proving active participation” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  The Investors have not alleged that the MB 
Directors or the Centre Defendants knew of the North Hills 
fraud, and in fact they concede a lack of knowledge in that 
“MB’s compliance officers failed to follow up on significant 
‘red flags’ that, if investigated, would have undoubtedly 
indentified Bloom’s fraud and prevented Investors’ losses.”  
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 40.) 
 
The Investors argue, however, that “because liability is 
secondary and not primary, a plaintiff need only [prove] a 
state of mind approximating recklessness … and not the sort 
of knowing misconduct that would be required to state a 
primary violation claim under Section 10(b).”  (Appellants’ 
Opening Br. at 37 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).)  They primarily rely on an unreported district court 
case, Lautenberg Foundation v. Madoff, No. 09-816, 2009 
WL 2928913, at *15 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009), for the 
proposition that “reckless failure to detect the fraud through 
enforcement of a reasonably adequate system of internal 
controls establishes ... participation in the fraud for purposes 
of [a] Section 20(a) claim.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 
38.)21
                                              
21 The Investors’ reliance on Lautenberg Foundation at 
this stage of the proceedings concerning their § 20(a) claims 
is somewhat misplaced, because the quoted language 
describes the district court’s view of the pleading standard 
necessary to survive a motion to dismiss, and not the proof 
required to survive a motion for summary judgment.  See 
Lautenberg Found., 2009 WL 2928913, at *15 (concluding 
  As they see it, the failure of the MB Directors and the 
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Centre Defendants to monitor Bloom’s activity with respect 
to North Hills, and in particular their failure to install an 
effective compliance system at MB, satisfies that recklessness 
standard. 
 
That approach is problematic.  To begin with, the 
Investors’ contention that they need only prove recklessness 
because § 20(a) liability is “secondary and not primary” is 
contrary to the general principle that, when liability is 
secondary or derivative, a more culpable mens rea, not a 
lesser one, is required.  See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (noting that 
secondary liability for copyright infringement requires 
intentional inducement of direct infringement); Inwood Labs., 
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (holding that 
secondary liability for trademark infringement arises when a 
manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to 
infringe); Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 
1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that secondary liability 
for patent infringement requires a showing that the defendant 
“knowingly induced the infringing acts” with “a specific 
intent to encourage another’s infringement of the patent”); 
Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380, 2387 n.12 (10th Cir. 1980) 
(noting that many courts have concluded that secondary 
liability for securities law violations requires either intent to 
aid and abet or knowledge of the underlying violation).  
 
In addition, contrary to the Investors’ contention, there 
is no support for the proposition that reckless inaction without 
knowledge of the underlying fraud is sufficient to establish 
                                                                                                     
only that “the Complaint satisfactorily pleads all elements of 
a prima facie control person claim”). 
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culpable participation for purposes of a § 20(a) claim.  The 
discussion in Lautenberg Foundation does not appear to go 
that far.  See Lautenberg Found., 2009 WL 2928913, at *14 
(“[T]he Complaint adequately pleads that [Defendant] knew 
or should have known that [his company] was engaging in a 
massive, multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme.”); id. at *15 
(“While mere inaction is not enough to rise to culpable 
participation, this Complaint pleads more than that.”).  
However, to the extent that that case can be read to suggest 
that knowledge of the underlying securities law violation is 
not required, we expressly reject it as incompatible with the 
“culpable participation” standard we articulated in Rochez 
Brothers. 
 
 Moreover, even if reckless inaction on the part of 
controlling persons, without knowledge of the underlying 
fraud, were sufficient to satisfy the culpable participation 
requirement, that standard is not met in this case.  A failure to 
oversee the enforcement of compliance protocols does not 
necessarily constitute recklessness for purposes of a § 20(a) 
claim.  Cf. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 539-
40 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that recklessness for purposes of 
Rule 10b-5 requires “an extreme departure from the standards 
of ordinary care” and that “claims essentially grounded on 
corporate mismanagement are not cognizable under federal 
law” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 885 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(acknowledging that the defendant “did not properly follow 
its own compliance rules” but holding that “the technical lack 
of compliance in these matters ... would not have constituted 
a violation of Section 20(a)”).  The fact that sloppy 
compliance practices at MB may have resulted in a lack of 
knowledge about Bloom’s activities at North Hills is thus 
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insufficient to establish culpable participation for purposes of 
§ 20(a) liability.22
 
   
 As the District Court noted, “the only answer to the 
question of what the [MB Directors and the] Centre 
Defendants did that intentionally furthered the fraud of 
Bloom is nothing.”  (App. at 16.)  Under the culpable 
participation standard that we articulated in Rochez Brothers, 
that answer is fatal to a § 20(a) claim, and the District Court 
properly granted summary judgment to the MB Directors and 
the Centre Defendants on that claim. 
 
                                              
22 The recklessness alleged in this case also bears little 
resemblance to that in Lautenberg Foundation.  In that case, 
the defendant was the chief compliance officer and general 
counsel of the company that perpetrated a massive Ponzi 
scheme.  2009 WL 2928913, at *2.  The Court therefore held 
that, “[a]ssuming the truth of the allegations, his reckless 
failure to detect fraud through enforcement of a reasonably 
adequate system of internal controls establishes his 
participation in the fraud for purposes of the Section 20(a) 
claim[]” because he was “charged with the responsibility and 
authority to run [the company] in accordance with the law.  
Id.  at *15.  In this case, none of the MB Directors or Centre 
Defendants worked for, let alone had any compliance 
responsibilities at, North Hills, the entity at which the actual 
fraud occurred, so that their alleged failure to instill a culture 
of compliance at MB cannot constitute recklessness as it 
related to North Hills.   
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2. Negligent Supervision Claim Against the 
 MB Directors  
 The District Court granted summary judgment to the 
MB Directors on the Investors’ negligent supervision claim 
because “[t]he cases applying this tort under Pennsylvania 
law repeatedly note that liability is imposed upon an 
employer” (Id. at 18), and “it does not follow that [Bloom’s] 
employment with MB turned individual board members of 
MB into Bloom’s employers as well” (id. at 19).  The District 
Court also held that, “[t]o succeed on this claim, there must 
be evidence that the individuals charged with negligent 
supervision knew or should have know that Bloom would 
operate North Hills ... as a Ponzi scheme” (Id. at 19), and that, 
absent a showing of such knowledge, “there is no evidence 
that Bloom’s fraud was reasonably foreseeable.” (Id.). 
 
 The Investors assert in response that “[p]ersons vested 
with supervisory responsibilities like the individual MB and 
Centre [defendants], who are corporate officers and directors 
of MB, can be liable for negligent supervision” under 
Pennsylvania law.  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 27.)  They 
further argue that the failure of the MB Directors to monitor 
Bloom’s activities, when those directors were aware that he 
was operating North Hills as a separate venture, rendered the 
fraud foreseeable as a matter of law.  Neither of the Investors’ 
arguments is persuasive. 
 
i. Negligent Supervision Claims 
 Against Corporate Directors 
 
 To recover for negligent supervision under 
Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must prove that his loss resulted 
from (1) a failure to exercise ordinary care to prevent an 
29 
 
intentional harm by an employee acting outside the scope of 
his employment, (2) that is committed on the employer’s 
premises, (3) when the employer knows or has reason to 
know of the necessity and ability to control the employee.23
                                              
23 Pennsylvania cases that recognize vicarious liability 
for negligent supervision draw on both the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency and the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  
See, e.g., Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 246 A.2d 418, 419-
20 (Pa. 1968); Heller v. Patwil Homes, Inc., 713 A.2d 105, 
107 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).  Section 213 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency provides, in relevant part: 
  
A person conducting an activity through 
servants or other agents is subject to liability for 
harm resulting from his conduct if he is 
negligent or reckless: … [b] in the employment 
of improper persons or instrumentalities in 
work involving risk of harm to others; or [c] in 
the supervision of the activity; or [d] in 
permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or 
other tortious conduct, by persons, whether or 
not his servants or agents, upon premises or 
with instrumentalities under his control. 
Id.  Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
provides: 
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable 
care so to control his servant while acting 
outside the scope of his employment as to 
prevent him from intentionally harming others 
… if  
(a) the servant (i) is upon the premises in 
possession of the master or upon which the 
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Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 346 A.2d 418, 420 (Pa. 
1968); Heller v. Patwil Homes, Inc., 713 A.2d 105, 107-08 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).   
 
Negligent supervision requires the four elements of 
common law negligence, i.e., duty, breach, causation, and 
damages.  Brezenski v. World Truck Transfer, Inc., 755 A.2d 
36, 42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 213 cmt. a).  It is specifically predicated on two 
duties of an employer:  the duty to reasonably monitor and 
control the activities of an employee, and the duty to abstain 
from hiring an employee and placing that employee in a 
situation where the employee will harm a third party.24
                                                                                                     
servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, 
or (ii) is using a chattel of the master, and  
  See 
(b) the master (i) knows or has reason to know 
that he has the ability to control his servant, and 
(ii) knows or should know the necessity and 
opportunity for exercising such control. 
Id.  The MB Defendants argue that that provision “relates 
solely to bodily harm, not the purely economic harm at issue 
here.”  (MB Defendants’ Br. at 20 (citing Semrad v. Edina 
Realty, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 528, 534 (Minn. 1992) (“Nothing in 
section 317 calls for its application in a case involving 
economic loss only.”)).)  However, Pennsylvania does not 
appear to limit the tort of negligent supervision to cases of 
physical injury.  See Heller, 713 A.2d at 109 (considering an 
“investment scam”). 
24 We have also described negligent supervision under 
Pennsylvania law as existing “where the employer fails to 
exercise ordinary care to prevent an intentional harm to a 
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Hutchinson v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052, 1059-60 (Pa. 1999) 
(affirming the applicability of common law negligence and 
discussing the duty of an employer articulated in Section 317 
of the Restatement). 
 
 Negligent supervision differs from employer 
negligence under a theory of respondeat superior.   
 
A claim for negligent supervision provides a 
remedy for injuries to third parties who would 
otherwise be foreclosed from recovery under 
the principal-agent doctrine of respondeat 
superior because the wrongful acts of 
                                                                                                     
third party which (1) is committed on the employer’s 
premises by an employee acting outside the scope of his 
employment and (2) is reasonably foreseeable.”  Petruska v. 
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 309 n.14 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The harm caused by the 
employee must be reasonably foreseeable because “[l]iability 
under Section 213 [of the Restatement [Second] of Agency] 
exists only if all the requirements of an action of tort for 
negligence exist.”  Gigli v. Palisades Collection, L.L.C., No. 
06-1428, 2008 WL 3853295, at *16 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2008) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Brezenski v. World 
Truck Transfer, Inc., 755 A.2d 36, 42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)).  
The definitions of negligent supervision set forth in Dempsey, 
supra, and Petruska are the same, but the former emphasizes 
the foreseeability of the need to control the employee, while 
the latter stresses the foreseeability of the harm the employee 
causes.  We discuss these foreseeability requirements infra 
Part II.A.2.ii. 
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employees in these cases are likely to be outside 
the scope of employment or not in furtherance 
of the principal’s business.”   
 
In re Am. Investors Life Ins. Co. Annuity Mktg. & Sales 
Practices Litig., No. 05-3588, 2007 WL 2541216, at *29 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2007) (citing Heller, 713 A.3d at 107). 
 
 The question of whether a corporate director, rather 
than a corporation as employer, may be held liable for 
negligent supervision can be resolved by asking whether a 
director owes a duty to third parties to supervise the 
corporation’s culpable employee.  See Harris v. KFC U.S. 
Props., Inc., No. 10-3198, 2012 WL 2327748, at *6 n.8 (E.D. 
Pa. June 18, 2012) (noting that “in cases alleging negligent 
hiring and supervising, the disputed issue is typically whether 
a duty to a third party exists”).  It is true that corporate 
directors are often said to have, as part of their fiduciary duty 
of loyalty, a duty to act in good faith for the benefit of the 
corporation, see Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 
A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (describing “the requirement to act 
in good faith” as “a subsidiary element[,] i.e., a condition, of 
the fundamental duty of loyalty” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)), and that, in turn, has been held to incorporate a 
duty of oversight, see In re Caremark Intern., Inc., Derivative 
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (positing liability 
due to “a sustained or systematic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight – such as an utter failure to attempt to 
assure [that] a reasonable information and reporting system 
exists”).  But that has never been understood as placing on 
directors the responsibility for day-to-day supervision of 
employees.  On the contrary, those quotidian tasks are the 
work of employee-supervisors, not the board of directors.  See 
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id. (noting that “require[ing] directors to possess detailed 
information about all aspects of the operation of the 
enterprise[] ... would simpl[y] be inconsistent with the scale 
and scope of efficient organization size in this technological 
age”).  
 
 The fiduciary duties of the board are of a different 
character entirely.  See Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 
F.3d 319, 338 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Under Pennsylvania law, 
corporate directors owe fiduciary duties ... ‘solely to the 
business corporation ... [that] may not be enforced directly by 
a shareholder or by any other person or group.’”  (quoting 15 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1717)).  Consequently, “in the absence 
of special circumstances it is the corporation, not its owner or 
officer, who is the principal or employer, and thus subject to 
vicarious liability for torts committed by its employees or 
agents.”  Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 286 (2003).  “[A] 
corporate employee typically acts on behalf of the 
corporation, not its owner or officer,” id., so that there is no 
agency relationship between an officer or director and an 
employee. 
 
 Virtually all of the cases in which liability for 
negligent supervision has been found under Pennsylvania law 
concern corporations and their employees.25
                                              
25 The Investors rely heavily on Hutchinson v. Luddy, 
742 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999), for the proposition that “claims for 
negligent supervision may include ‘superiors’ of servants who 
commit wrongful acts.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 28 
(citing Hutchinson, 742 A.2d at 1059).)  The Investors also 
argue that “the court in Hutchinson focused on who had 
‘supervisory responsibility or a real right to consider the 
  See, e.g., 
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issues of [the employee’s] retention.’”  (Id. (quoting 
Hutchinson, 742 A.2d at 1057.) Hutchinson concerned claims 
of child molestation against a priest in the Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown.  The Court found that the 
bishop (as well as the Diocese) could be held liable for 
negligent supervision because he “knew for certain that [the 
priest] had a propensity for pedophilic behavior and [was] 
aware of several specific instances of such conduct.”  
Hutchinson, 742 A.2d at 1059. 
Hutchinson, however, is inapposite.  The Investors 
quote the phrase “supervisory responsibility or a real right to 
consider the issue of [the employee’s] employment” (which 
the trial court in Hutchinson had used as part of a jury 
instruction) entirely out of context.  That phrase was intended 
to distinguish the supervisory role of the Diocese and the 
bishop from that of the priest’s former parish and pastor, after 
the priest had left the parish and was employed directly by the 
Diocese.  See id. at 1056-57.  The statement does not suggest 
general liability for those in a “supervisory” capacity, and all 
the cases cited by the Hutchinson court as “analogous,” id. at 
1058, involve a defendant that was a corporate entity and 
harm that was caused by an employee or agent of that entity.  
See id. at 1058-59 (discussing Dempsey, 246 A.2d at 418 
(security agency defendant for assault by employee guard); 
Golden Spread Council, Inc. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 
1996) (local branch of Boy Scouts of America defendant for 
sexual molestation by scoutmaster); Macquay v. Eno, 662 
A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995) (school district defendant for 
employees’ abuse of students)).  Also, “in Hutchinson, 
liability clearly was premised upon the master-servant 
relationship between the priest and his superiors as well as the 
special relationship between the parishioner, on the one hand, 
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Dempsey, 248 A.3d at 420-23 (discussing various early cases 
of negligent supervision, in all of which the defendant was a 
corporate employer); Harris, 2012 WL 2327748, at *7  
(considering liability of fast food company for assault by 
employee on a customer who was slow in ordering); Corr. 
Med. Care, 2008 WL 248977, at *15-16 (considering liability 
of employer for failure to supervise employees conducting 
private investigations); In re Am. Investors Life Ins. Co., 2007 
WL 2541216, at *29 (dismissing negligent supervision claims 
against insurer for fraudulent sales practices by employees 
because they were acting at the employer’s direction).  We 
take that clear feature to be dispositive, so that when, as in 
this case, “Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that [Defendant] 
is ... not an employer ... ‘negligent supervision’ is not a viable 
theory of liability.”  Quandry Solutions, Inc. v. Verifone Inc., 
No. 07-97, 2007 WL 655606, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2007); 
cf. id. (“In contrast to the employer-employee context, there is 
no general duty for a parent corporation to supervise its 
subsidiary; absent a piercing of the corporate veil, a parent 
corporation is not normally liable for wrongful acts or 
contractual obligations of a subsidiary ... .” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 
 As the District Court noted, the Investors brought their 
negligent supervision claim only against the MB Directors, 
                                                                                                     
and the superiors of the church, on the other hand.”  F.D.P. ex 
rel. S.M.P. v. Ferrara, 804 A.2d 1221, 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2002).  Bloom did not stand in the same relationship to the 
MB Directors as a priest to his bishop, nor do the Investors 
stand in the same sort of relationship to the MB Directors as 
parishioners to the hierarchy of a Catholic Diocese. 
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and not against MB as Bloom’s employer,26 and “[i]t does not 
follow that [Bloom’s] employment with MB turned individual 
board members of MB into Bloom’s employers as well.”  
(App. at 19.)  As a result, the Investors’ claim against the 
directors under a theory of negligent supervision is not viable, 
notwithstanding their efforts to cast the directors in a 
“supervisory” role.27
 
 
                                              
26  The Investors have included MB as one of the “MB 
Parties” against whom they assert liability for negligent 
supervision in their brief on appeal.  (See Appellants’ 
Opening Br. at 5, 29, 35.)  However, the Amended Complaint 
alleged liability “[f]or Negligent Supervision By Officers and 
Directors” only against the MB Directors. (See  App. at 103.)  
The reasons for that pleading choice are not clear from the 
record, but MB was not the subject of the allegations in the 
Investors’ negligent supervision claim. 
27 The Investors allege that Machinist occupied a 
different supervisory position from the other MB Directors in 
that, as MB’s chief operating officer, he was Bloom’s 
“immediate superior.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 29.)  
However, the extent of Machinist’s supervisory authority 
over Bloom is not clear from the record.  Machinist and 
Bloom were co-managing partners of MB and held the same 
percentage ownership in the company, suggesting that they 
may have been effectively of equal rank in the organization.  
But even if Machinist had a supervisory role greater than that 
of the other MB Directors, the Investors’ negligent 
supervision claim against him still fails based on a lack of 
foreseeability, as discussed infra Part II.A.2.ii. 
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ii. Foreseeability Requirement for 
 Negligent Supervision 
 
 Even assuming that corporate directors may be held 
liable as “supervisors,” to prevail in their claim for negligent 
supervision, the Investors would also have to satisfy two 
separate foreseeability requirements.  First, “[u]nder 
Pennsylvania law, ... an employer may be liable for 
negligence if it knew or should have known of the necessity 
for exercising control of its employee.”  Devon IT, Inc. v. 
IBM Corp., 805 F. Supp. 2d 110, 132 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing 
Brezenski v. World Truck Transfer, Inc., 755 A.2d 36, 39-40 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (citing Dempsey, 246 A.2d at 422)).  
Second, the harm that the improperly supervised employee 
caused to the third party must also have been reasonably 
foreseeable.  Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 309 
n.14 (3d Cir. 2006); Mullen v. Topper’s Salon & Health Spa, 
Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 553, 556 (E.D. Pa. 2000).  The 
requirement that the employer foresee the need to supervise 
the employee comes from § 317 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, see supra note 23, and the requirement that the harm 
itself is foreseeable comes from § 213 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency, which requires that all of the elements of 
the tort of negligence exist in order for liability for negligent 
supervision to attach, see supra note 24. 
 
 An employer knows, or should know, of the need to 
control an employee if the employer knows that the employee 
has dangerous propensities that might cause harm to a third 
party.  See Hutchinson, 742 A.2d at 1057-58 (citing Dempsey, 
246 A.2d at 423 (holding employer not liable where 
employee’s act of “horseplay” while on the job did not 
suggest a propensity for violence)); see also Coath v. Jones, 
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419 A.2d 1249, 1250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (holding employer 
liable where employer should have known of employee’s 
inclination to assault women)).  A harm is foreseeable if it is 
part of a general type of injury that has a reasonable 
likelihood of occurring.  See Serbin v. Bora Corp., Ltd., 96 
F.3d 66, 72 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The concept of foreseeability 
means the likelihood of the occurrence of the general type of 
risk rather than the likelihood of the occurrence of the precise 
chain of events leading to the injury.”).      
 
 The Investors’ negligent supervision claim fails both 
foreseeability tests.  First, there is no reason that the MB 
Directors should have foreseen the need to supervise Bloom 
with respect to his operation of North Hills.  An employer is 
under “no duty ... to discover, at its peril, the fraudulent 
machinations in which [an employee] was involved outside 
the scope of his employment.”  Cover v. Cushing Capital 
Corp., 497 A.2d 249, 253-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).  While 
some (and perhaps all) of the MB Directors were aware that 
Bloom was running North Hills as a hedge fund outside of 
MB, nothing in Bloom’s conduct as an employee of MB 
suggested that Bloom would use North Hills to defraud 
investors.  Nor could the MB Directors have learned of the 
fraud without considerable investigation, given Bloom’s 
success at concealing the Ponzi-scheme nature of North Hills 
for almost ten years.  For the same reasons, the Ponzi scheme 
and the harm that it would cause to North Hills investors were 
not reasonably foreseeable by the MB Directors.   
 
 As the District Court properly noted, the Investors 
“failed to submit any evidence that any [of the MB Directors] 
had reason to know at the time he was hired that Bloom was 
defrauding North Hills, L.P.’s investors” (App. at 20), and the 
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Investors merely speculate about what the MB Directors 
might have learned had they asked Bloom more questions.  
Because a detailed inquiry into an employee’s personal 
history or outside activities is not generally required,28
 
 see 
Dempsey, 246 A.2d at 423 (finding no evidence that employer 
was negligent in investigating employees’ past or that a more 
thorough investigation would have uncovered misconduct), 
the negligent supervision claim fails on the basis of 
foreseeability, as well as on the defendants’ status as directors 
of MB rather than as Bloom’s employers, and the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment to the MB 
Directors on that claim. 
B. Claims Under Rule 10b-5 And The UTPCPL 
1. Rule 10b-5 Violations 
 
 The District Court dismissed the Rule 10b-5 claim 
against Altman, noting that “the Amended Complaint makes 
no allegations that Altman was aware of Bloom’s 
squandering of North Hills’ assets.”  (App. at 41.)  The Court 
explained that MB could not be liable under Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 because Bloom’s 
fraudulent statements, and Altman’s allegedly deceptive 
statements, related solely to investments in North Hills, “an 
entity unrelated to MB.”  (App. at 21.)  The Court noted that 
“Plaintiffs do not charge that any individuals made false 
                                              
28 We speak here strictly of the duties associated with 
the common law tort of negligent supervision under 
Pennsylvania law, and do not imply anything regarding duties 
that may exist by virtue of other common law principles, 
statutes, rules, or regulations. 
40 
 
statements about MB or its investments.”  (Id.)  Moreover, the 
Court said, “[w]ere this case about Bloom acting on behalf of 
MB, MB could not escape liability for Bloom’s conduct,” but 
“this case presents a different set of circumstances” because 
Bloom’s fraud was perpetrated through an entity that had 
existed before he began working for MB and that had many 
investors who were not investors in MB.  (Id.)  
 
  The Investors challenge the District Court’s reasoning 
as to both Altman and MB, claiming that the Court 
“referenced no factual support for it premise that North Hills 
and MB were unrelated in the context of the Investors’ [10b-
5] claims.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 42.)  The Investors 
also argue that the District Court erred when it dismissed their 
10b-5 claim against Altman because they had “allege[d] facts 
sufficient to give rise to a strong inference that defendants 
were reckless.”  (Id. at 53.)  Finally, the Investors say that 
statements by Bloom and Altman may be imputed to MB, 
“regardless of whether North Hills was affiliated with MB, 
because [their statements] were made in the course of their 
employment and with the apparent authority of MB.”  (Id. at 
43.) 
 
 Rule 10b-5 makes it “unlawful ... [t]o engage in any 
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person[] in connection 
with the ... sale of any security.”  17 C.FR. § 240.10b-5.  The 
Rule implements Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which 
makes it unlawful to “use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security ... , any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j(b). 
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 To make out a securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5, 
“a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant made a 
materially false or misleading statement or omitted to state a 
material fact necessary to make a statement not misleading; 
(2) the defendant acted with scienter; and (3) the plaintiff’s 
reliance on the defendant’s misstatement caused him or her 
injury.”  Marion v. TDI, Inc., 591 F.3d 137, 152 (3d Cir. 
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Scienter is “an 
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”  Scattergood v. 
Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 622 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing  Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-214 (1976)).  Rule 
10b-5 thus requires “more than negligent nonfeasance ... as a 
precondition to the imposition of civil liability.”  Id., 425 U.S. 
at 215.  The pleading requirements for a Rule 10b-5 violation 
are heightened by the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), 
which requires that a plaintiff “state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with 
the required state of mind.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
 
i. The 10b-5 Claim Against Altman 
 
 The 10b-5 claim against Altman fails for the simple 
reason that the Investors have provided no evidence of 
scienter.   To prove scienter, the Investors must show that 
Altman, with “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud,”  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319 (quoting 
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193-94), made some material 
misrepresentation or omitted some material fact and so left a 
materially misleading impression on them.  The Investors 
have adduced no such proof.  They do not contend that, when 
Altman and Bloom met with Belmont and Wallace of PFS, or 
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that when Altman allegedly marketed North Hills as an MB 
investment option to the Kellys, Altman knew that North 
Hills was a fraud.  The most they have said on this score is 
that Altman “touted” North Hills.   
 
The Investors likewise fail to “specify the role” of 
Altman in Bloom’s fraud or to “demonstrate[e] ... [his] 
involvement in misstatements or omissions,” see Winer 
Family Trust, 503 F.3d at 335-36, as required under the 
PSLRA.  Rather, the Investors attempt to satisfy the scienter 
requirement, and the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard, 
by arguing that Altman’s praise of North Hills without 
sufficient investigation gives rise to a “strong inference that 
defendants were reckless.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 53.)  
However, for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 claim, “[a] reckless 
statement is one involving not merely simple, or even 
inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of 
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the 
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been 
aware of it.”  Inst. Invs. Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 
267 n.42 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Advanta Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Even if Altman did discuss North Hills as an 
investment option with Belmont, Wallace, or the Kellys, there 
is no evidence that the danger of misleading them was either 
known to Altman or so obvious that it should have been 
known, given Bloom’s apparently successful investment track 
record.  Therefore, Altman’s statements about North Hills 
were neither knowingly false nor reckless, and the District 
Court properly dismissed the 10b-5 claim against him. 
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ii. The 10b-5 Claim Against MB 
  
 In contrast to Altman, Bloom’s violations of Rule 10b-
5 are beyond dispute,29
 
 and the Investors argue that those 
violations may be imputed to MB as his employer.  The 
Investors argue for imputation of Rule 10b-5 liability to MB 
because “Bloom jointly marketed MB and North Hills, led 
Investors to believe [North Hills] was a[n] MB product[,] and 
[Bloom] was not the only MB employee involved in 
marketing North Hills,” the others being Machinist and 
Altman.  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 42.)        
 Although the Investors’ underlying securities fraud 
claims are governed by federal law, the issue of imputation is 
determined by state law.  See O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1994) (declining to 
“adopt[] a special federal common-law rule divesting States 
of authority over the entire law of imputation” and holding 
that “[state] law, not federal law, governs the imputation of 
knowledge to corporate victims of alleged negligence”).  
Under Pennsylvania law,  
 
[T]he fraud of an officer of a corporation is 
imputed to the corporation when the officer’s 
fraudulent contact was (1) in the course of his 
employment, and (2) for the benefit of the 
corporation.  This is true even if the officer’s 
conduct was unauthorized, effected for his own 
benefit but clothed with apparent authority of 
                                              
29  Bloom pleaded guilty to all of the fraud-based 
counts in the Information filed against him.  See supra Part 
I.A.5. 
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the corporation, or contrary to instructions.  The  
underlying reason is that a corporation can 
speak and act only through its agents and so 
must be accountable for any acts committed by 
one of its agents within his actual or apparent 
scope of authority and while transacting 
corporate business.   
 
In re Pers. & Bus. Ins. Agency, 334 F.3d 239, 242-43 (3d Cir. 
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).30
 
   
 “[T]he imputation doctrine recognizes that principals 
generally are responsible for the acts of agents committed 
within the scope of their authority.”  Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research 
Found. v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP (AHERF), 989 A.2d 
313, 333 (Pa. 2010).  “This rule of liability is not based on 
any presumed authority in the agent to do the acts, but on the 
ground of public policy … that the principal who has placed 
                                              
30 Although we did not base that imputation standard, 
which we first articulated in Rochez Brothers, 527 F.2d at 
884, specifically on Pennsylvania law, “the principles which 
[we] espoused are consistent with Pennsylvania agency law, 
succinctly stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court long 
ago.” Greenberg v. Grant Thornton L.L.P. (In re Greenberg), 
212 B.R. 76, 83-84 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing Nat’l Bank 
of Shamokin v. Waynesboro Knitting Co., 172 A. 131, 134 
(Pa. 1934) (“The rule that knowledge or notice on the part of 
the agent is to be treated as notice to the principal is founded 
on the duty of the agent to communicate all material 
information to his principal and the presumption that he has 
done so.”)).  
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the agent in the position of trust and confidence should suffer, 
rather than an innocent stranger.”  Aiello v. Ed Saxe Real 
Estate, Inc., 499 A.2d 282, 285 (Pa. 1985).  The imputation 
doctrine also advances public policy goals in that, “because it 
is the principal who has selected and delegated responsibility 
to [its] agents[,] ... the doctrine creates incentives for the 
principal to do so carefully and responsibly.”  AHERF, 989 
A.2d at 333 (citing Aiello, 499 A.2d at 285-86); accord 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 5.03 cmt. b (2006) 
(“Imputation creates incentives for a principal to choose 
agents carefully and to use care in delegating functions to 
them.”). 
 
 Public policy concerns also implicate the “adverse 
interest” exception to the imputation doctrine.  Under the 
“adverse interest” exception, “where an agent acts in his own 
interest, and to the corporation’s detriment, imputation 
generally will not apply.”  AHERF, 989 A.2d at 333 (citing 
Todd v. Skelly, 120 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa. 1956)).  The District 
Court applied the adverse interest exception only in the 
context of the UTPCPL, discussed infra Part II.C.2, and held 
that it barred imputation of Bloom’s violations of that statute 
to MB.  However, as the MB Defendants point out, arguments 
as to the potential application of the adverse interest 
exception “apply with equal force” to the Investors’ 10b-5 
claim (MB Defendants’ Br. at 14), and so we turn to that 
exception at this point. 
 
  “The primary controversy surrounding the appropriate 
application of the adverse-interest exception ... concerns the 
degree of self-interest required, or, conversely, the quantum 
of benefit to the corporation necessary to avoid the 
exception’s application (where self-interest is evident).”  
46 
 
AHERF, 989 A.2d at 334.  At one end of the spectrum are 
cases holding that any benefit to the corporation will bar the 
application of the exception and trigger imputation.  Cf. Todd, 
120 A.2d at 909 (“Where an agent acts in his own interest 
which is antagonistic to that of his principal, ... the principal 
who has received no benefit therefrom will not be liable for 
the agent’s tortious act.”).  At the other end of the spectrum 
are cases that hesitate to impute liability, even in the face of 
some benefit to the corporation.  Cf. Adelphia Commc’ns 
Corp. v. Bank of America (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 
365 B.R. 24, 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that the 
adverse interest exception might be applicable when there 
was only “a peppercorn of benefit to a corporation from the 
wrongful conduct”).  Courts that favor “strong imputation 
rules, including a low threshold for benefit, support[] a potent 
form of in pari delicto defense,”  AHERF, 989 A.2d at 334, 
based on a concern “that weakening the defense and 
associated rules of imputation would represent an 
inappropriate reallocation of risks, as well as eviscerate 
socially useful defenses which otherwise would be available 
to those who transact with corporations,” id. (citing Am. Int’l 
Grp., Inc. Consol. Derivative Litig. v. Greenberg, 976 A.2d 
872, 889 (Del. Ch. 2009)).  By contrast, courts that see 
“difficulty with applying too liberal a litmus for benefit,” 
AHERF, 989 A.2d at 334, are concerned about potential 
“collusion between the agent and the defendant,” id., because 
imputation, and the resulting availability of the in pari delicto 
defense, “would provide total dispensation to defendants 
knowingly and substantially assisting insider misconduct,” id. 
at 335 (quoting In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 365 B.R. at 
56).   
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 Whatever conclusions the District Court may have 
reached about the policy concerns affecting the adverse 
interest exception,31
                                              
31 It does not appear that this case implicates the 
concerns about the availability of the in pari delicto defense 
that one might argue to support the District Court’s liberal 
application of the adverse interest exception.  No defendant 
has tried to raise that defense – and with good reason, as there 
does not appear to be any basis at all for invoking it here. 
 it erred in applying it.  Under the 
exception, “the question generally should be whether there is 
a sufficient lack of benefit (or apparent adversity) [to the 
corporation] such that it is fair to charge the third party with 
notice that the agent is not acting with the principal’s 
authority.”  AHERF, 989 A.2d at 338.  The Court presumed 
that knowledge of Bloom’s fraud is not imputable to MB 
because “[[w]]here one in transacting the business of his 
principal is committing fraud for his own benefit, he is not 
acting within the scope of his authority as his principal’s 
agent ... .”  (App. at 26 (quoting Lilly v. Hamilton Bank of 
N.Y., 178 F. 53, 56 (3d Cir. 1909) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).)  However, imputation to an employer is proper 
based on “acts committed by one of its agents within his 
actual or apparent scope of authority,” In re Pers. & Bus. Ins. 
Agency, 334 F.3d at 243, and a swindler may still act with 
apparent authority, even if he is acting for his own benefit.  
Also, the District Court found sufficient “adversity of 
interest” in the fact that the discovery of the North Hills fraud 
ultimately destroyed MB as well.  But that adverse impact 
occurred only after the exposure of the North Hills Ponzi 
scheme.  While the scheme was on-going, at the time the 
Investors put their money in North Hills, what they knew did 
not necessarily give them notice that Bloom was acting 
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outside the scope of his employment.  Indeed, what they 
knew and what they should have concluded are contested 
issues of fact. 
 
Ultimately, under Pennsylvania law,“[i]n light of the 
competing concerns, the appropriate approach to benefit and 
self-interest is best related back to the underlying purpose of 
imputation, which is fair risk-allocation, including the 
affordance of appropriate protection to those who transact 
business with corporations.”  AHERF, 989 A.2d at 335.  We 
therefore conclude that imputation may be appropriate in this 
case, if the Investors can prove that the manner in which 
Bloom marketed North Hills to them while he was working 
for MB, and the apparent benefit to MB, made it appear that 
he marketed North Hills within the scope of his authority as a 
senior executive of MB. 
 
 There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Bloom’s fraudulent statements were made as part of his 
employment with, and for the benefit of MB, so that those 
statements might be imputed to MB.  On the one hand, the 
record indicates that Bloom made it clear that he, not MB or 
any of its other employees, personally managed North Hills, 
and North Hills’ marketing and subscription materials, tax 
reporting documents, and capital account statements did not 
include any references to MB.  On the other hand, there is 
evidence that Bloom marketed North Hills to existing and 
potential clients of MB in meetings that were ostensibly held 
to discuss MB’s investment advisory services, and that he at 
times represented North Hills to be an MB fund.  There is 
also evidence that Bloom openly used other MB employees to 
conduct North Hills business, used his MB business card in 
meetings in which he marketed North Hills, and presented an 
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asset allocation recommending an investment in North Hills 
on MB letterhead, all of which may have created the 
impression for at least some of the Investors that Bloom 
operated North Hills under the apparent authority of MB.  
Also, Bloom’s operation of North Hills appears to have been 
of at least some benefit to MB.  There is evidence that MB 
used access to North Hills as a selling point in the marketing 
of MB’s investment advisory services, and MB used North 
Hills as a source of potential clients, soliciting North Hills’ 
largest investors for business.  If those points of evidence are 
accepted, there is a basis for imputation. 
 
 Imputation of Bloom’s violations of Rule 10b-5 to MB 
would also be consistent with the public policy goals served 
by the imputation doctrine.  The record suggests that MB 
placed Bloom “in [a] position of trust and confidence,” Aiello, 
499 A.2d at 285, that it permitted him to mix the operation of 
North Hills with his legitimate duties at MB, and that it 
should therefore share responsibility for the resulting losses.  
Likewise, MB “selected and delegated responsibility to” 
Bloom, AHERF, 909 A.2d at 333, but arguably did not do so 
“carefully and responsibly,” id., given that MB officers and 
directors knew that Bloom was operating North Hills but 
accepted compliance reports by Bloom that failed to 
adequately disclose details of the North Hills’s operation.   
 
 Recognizing that “imputation rules justly operate to 
protect third parties on account of their reliance on an agent’s 
actual or apparent authority,” id. at 336, we cannot say that 
imputation of Bloom’s violations of Rule 10b-5 to MB is 
inappropriate as a matter of law.  The District Court thus 
erred when it granted summary judgment to MB on the 
Investors’10b-5 claim. 
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2. Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer 
 Protection Law Claims  
 
 The District Court concluded that Altman could not be 
held liable under the UTPCPL because “the Amended 
Complaint does not sufficiently allege deceptive conduct on 
the part of Altman,” and “[w]ithout any factual allegation that 
Altman was somehow involved with Bloom’s fraud, ... [the 
Investors] cannot simply call Altman’s actions deceptive and 
equate it with Bloom’s stealing.”  (App. at 49.) 
 
 The District Court also granted summary judgment to 
MB on the UTPCPL claim.  The Court recognized that 
statements by Bloom could potentially be imputed to MB, but 
it looked to the adverse interest exception to the doctrine of 
imputation to conclude that MB was not liable.  The Investors 
argue that the District Court improperly applied the adverse 
interest exception because “[a]pplication of that exception is 
not determined from the perspective of the employer, as the 
District Court did, but rather on how the defrauded party 
perceives the speaker’s authority.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. 
at 25.)     
 
 Pennsylvania’s UTPCPL, 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 201-1 et seq., “is designed to protect the public from fraud 
and deceptive business practices.”  Gardner v. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 544 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2008).  The 
statute provides that  
 
[a]ny person who purchases or leases goods or 
services primarily for personal, family or 
household purposes and thereby suffers any 
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ascertainable loss of money or property, real or 
personal, as a result of the use or employment 
by any person of a method, act or practice 
declared unlawful by section 3 of this act, may 
bring a private action to recover actual damages 
or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is 
greater. 
 
73 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201-9.2(a).  “The UTPCPL 
regulates an array of practices which might be analogized to 
passing off, misappropriation, trademark infringement, 
disparagement, false advertising, fraud, breach of contract, 
and breach of warranty.”  Ash v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 
877, 881 (Pa. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
statute lists twenty specific prohibited practices, see 73 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201-2(4)(i)-(xx), and also contains a 
“catch-all” provision, see id. § 201-2(4)(xxi), which the 
Investors cite as the basis for their UTPCPL claim.  The 
catch-all provision provides a private right of action against a 
person “[e]ngaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive 
conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of 
misunderstanding.”  Id.   
 
In the wake of an amendment to the UTPCPL in 1996 
that expanded the catch-all provision to cover “deceptive” as 
well as fraudulent conduct, “Pennsylvania law regarding the 
standard of liability under the UTPCPL catchall is ‘in flux.’”  
Fazio v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. 1240 WDA, 2012 WL 
6177271, at *8 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2012); see also id. at 
*7-8 (comparing cases before and after the 1996 amendment 
of the UTPCPL).32
                                              
32  Division in our district courts parallels that in 
  Consequently, we are called upon to 
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predict what interpretation of the “deceptive conduct” 
standard the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt.  The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s recent decision in Fazio was 
based on “decisions from the Commonwealth Court, the 
federal courts interpreting Pennsylvania law, as well as the 
statutory language of the post-amendment catchall provision.”  
2012 WL 6177271 at *9.  The district court decisions on 
which Fazio relied suggest that deceptive conduct does not 
require proof of the elements of common law fraud, but that  
knowledge of the falsity of one’s statements or the misleading 
quality of one’s conduct is still required.33
                                                                                                     
Pennsylvania’s own courts.  See Molley v. Five Town 
Chrysler, Inc., No. 07-5415, 2009 WL 440292, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 18, 2009) (“Clearly there is uncertainty within the 
Circuit as to what type of conduct the ‘catch all’ provision of 
the UTPCPL protects.”).  Some district courts have held that 
“it is no longer necessary for a plaintiff to allege all of the 
elements of common law fraud in order to recover under the 
[UTP]CPL,” Flores v. Shapiro & Kreisman, 246 F. Supp. 2d 
427, 432 (E.D. Pa. 2002), and that a “plaintiff may allege 
deception, as opposed to common law fraud,” Davis v. Mony 
Life Ins. Co., No. 08-0938, 2008 WL 4170250, at *6 (W.D. 
Pa. Sept. 2, 2008).  Other courts have continued to require 
plaintiffs proceeding under the catch-all provision of the 
UTPCPL to prove the elements of common law fraud, even 
when alleging mere deception.  See Rock v. Voshell, 397 F. 
Supp. 2d 616, 622 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (noting that “all of the 
fraud elements are still required”).   
   See Wilson v. 
33 It appears that a UTPCPL claim based on deceptive 
conduct differs from a claim based on fraudulent conduct in 
that a plaintiff  “does not need to prove all of the elements of 
common-law fraud or meet the particularity requirement of 
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Parisi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 637, 666 (M.D. Pa. 2008)  (“A 
deceptive act [under the UTPCPL] is the act of intentionally 
giving a false impression or a tort arising from a false 
representation made knowingly or recklessly with the intent 
that another person should detrimentally rely on it.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Therefore, a defendant cannot be 
held “derivatively liable” under the UTPCPL for the 
fraudulent actions of a third party when “plaintiff fails to 
allege or present any evidence that [the defendant] ever 
knowingly engaged in misrepresentation.”  Canty v. 
Equicredit Corp. of Am., No. 01-5804, 2003 WL 21243268, 
at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2003). 
 
i. The UTPCPL Claim Against 
 Altman 
 
 The deceptive conduct that the Investors allege against 
Altman was limited to three things: (1) his preparing (with 
Bloom) a proposed asset allocation plan for Belmont that 
recommended placing 20 percent of Belmont’s MB-advised 
investments in North Hills, (2) his describing to Belmont and 
Wallace that MB had access to North Hills as an investment 
vehicle, and (3) his advising Belmont to transfer $1 million 
from his Schwab account into North Hills in February 2008.  
In dismissing the UTPCPL claim against Altman, the District 
                                                                                                     
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).”  Schnell v. Bank of 
New York Mellon, 828 F. Supp. 2d 798, 807 (E.D. Pa. 2011).  
In Fazio, the Superior Court held that that a jury instruction 
that “deceptive conduct” for purposes of the UTPCPL is 
“‘misleading’ conduct accurately set[s] forth the standard of 
liability under the amended catchall provision.”  2012 WL 
6177271 at *9. 
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Court followed the more plaintiff-friendly standard of courts 
“that have allowed UTPCPL claims to move forward without 
demonstrating all of the elements of common law fraud” 
(App. at 48), but held that the three complained-of acts were 
not sufficient to establish deceptive conduct. 
 
 As a threshold issue, neither Perez nor the Kellys have 
stated a UTPCPL claim against Altman because they have not 
alleged any conduct on his part, deceptive or otherwise, that 
caused them to invest in North Hills.  Cf. Weinberg v. Sun 
Co., 777 A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. 2001) (noting that a UTPCPL 
plaintiff must demonstrate that he justifiably relied on the 
defendant’s deceptive practice and that he suffered harm as a 
result of that reliance).   
 
 As to the claim of Belmont and PFS, there is no 
evidence that, in any of the conduct noted above, Altman 
acted either to defraud or deceive them.  That claim fails even 
under the “deceptive conduct” standard that the District Court 
applied, because none of Altman’s conduct comprised either 
“the act of intentionally giving a false impression” or “a false 
representation made knowingly or recklessly,” Wilson, 549 F. 
Supp. 2d at 666, given that he is not alleged to have had any 
knowledge of the North Hills fraud at the time.  
Consequently, the District Court correctly dismissed the 
UTPCPL claims against Altman for a lack of factual 
allegations sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the catch-
all provision of the UTPCPL. 
 
ii. The UTPCPL Claim Against MB 
 
 The District Court held that the adverse interest 
exception barred the imputation to MB of Bloom’s admitted 
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frauds, which all acknowledge were violations of the 
UTPCPL.34
 
  Our earlier discussion of the proper application 
of the adverse interest exception, supra, is equally applicable 
to the Investors’ UTPCPL claim against MB.  As noted 
above,“[i]n light of the competing concerns, the appropriate 
approach to benefit and self-interest is best related back to the 
underlying purpose of imputation, which is fair risk-
allocation, including the affordance of appropriate protection 
to those who transact business with corporations.”  AHERF, 
989 A.2d at 335.   
 As a result, there remains a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether Bloom’s violations of the UTPCPL may be 
imputed to MB.  There is some evidence that MB benefitted 
from Bloom’s operation of North Hills, to the extent that 
access to North Hills was a selling point for MB, and MB was 
able to solicit North Hills investors for advisory business.  
There is, however, also evidence that the cross-marketing 
benefit to MB was limited, given that the two entities had 
only four clients in common, two of whom were Belmont and 
the Kellys.  Also, MB never collected any fees or received 
any remuneration on account of any of the Investors’ 
investments in North Hills.   
 
 Whether there was a sufficient lack of benefit to MB 
such that the Investors should have known that statements by 
                                              
34 Bloom’s violations of the UTPCPL are presumably 
uncontested because he pled guilty to all of the fraud-based 
counts in the Information against him, which included various 
counts that involved deceptive practices with respect to the 
marketing of North Hills.  See supra Part II.A.5. 
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Bloom in violation of the UTPCPL were made without MB’s 
authority is a question for the trier of fact. 
 
C.  Claims For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty  
 The Investors contend before us, as they did before the 
District Court, that Altman breached a fiduciary duty to them 
“by failing to investigate North Hills before recommending it 
as a suitable investment” (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 60), and 
that MB also breached a fiduciary duty because “MB should 
have recognized Bloom’s fraud,” (id. at 50).  The District 
Court rejected those contentions.  It concluded that “[s]imply 
because Altman was an investment advisor at the same 
location where Bloom worked ... does not create a fiduciary 
relationship” (App. at 52), and therefore Altman could not be 
held liable for a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the 
Investors.  The Court granted summary judgment to MB on 
the fiduciary duty claim because MB owed no such duty to 
those Investors who invested directly in North Hills, i.e., PFS 
and Perez, and because those Investors to whom MB did owe 
fiduciary duties, i.e., Belmont and the Kellys, had adduced no 
evidence that MB’s alleged failure to act in their best interests 
was the cause of their North Hills losses.   
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that a 
plaintiff alleging a fiduciary breach must first demonstrate 
that a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed, see Basile 
v. H & R Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115, 1119-22 (Pa. 2000), 
which requires that “one person has reposed a special 
confidence in another to the extent that the parties do not deal 
with each other on equal terms.”  In re Estate of Clark, 359 
A.2d 777, 781 (Pa. 1976) (internal quotation marks 
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omitted).35
 
  “Although no precise formula has been devised to 
ascertain the existence of a confidential relationship, it has 
been said that such a relationship ... exists whenever one 
occupies toward another such a position of advisor or 
counselor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act 
in good faith for the other’s interest.”  Silver v. Silver, 219 
A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. 1966).  
                                              
35 We note that the fiduciary duty claims present a 
question of the proper choice of law.  The claims are 
purportedly brought under state law, even though, as is more 
fully discussed herein, they are arguably an attempt to bring 
claims under federal law despite there being no private right 
of action available under federal of law.  Assuming that the 
claims can be brought under state law, the question remains 
as to whether the law of Pennsylvania or of New York 
applies.  The Investors are all citizens of the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania, and Altman and MB are citizens of the State 
of New York.  See supra note 17.  The parties have briefed 
only Pennsylvania law, and they explained at oral argument 
before us that they viewed the law of the state whose citizens 
claim the protection of the fiduciary relationship as 
controlling.  The record is unclear as to whether the alleged 
fiduciary breaches by Altman and MB occurred in 
Pennsylvania or New York.  However, following the 
approach of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “[s]ince the 
parties did not see fit to question the application of 
Pennsylvania law, we infer that th[at] state was in fact the 
situs of most of the allegedly wrongful conduct and 
accordingly decide the issues of fiduciary responsibility on 
the basis of [that state’s] law.”  Vulcanized Rubber & Plastics 
Co. v. Scheckler,  162 A.2d 400, 403 n.2 (Pa. 1960).   
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 The Investors claim a breach of fiduciary duty by MB 
under state law, but, at least insofar as Pennsylvania law is 
concerned, the evolution of duties governing investment 
advisers as fiduciaries appears to have been shaped 
exclusively by the Advisers Act and federal common law.  
The Advisers Act makes it unlawful for an investment adviser  
 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to 
engage in any transaction, practice, or course of 
business which operates as a fraud or deceit 
upon any client or prospective client; (3) acting 
as principal for his own account, knowingly to 
sell any security to or purchase any security 
from a client, or acting as broker for a person 
other than such client, knowingly to effect any 
sale or purchase of any security for the account 
of such client, without disclosing to such client 
in writing before the completion of such 
transaction the capacity in which he is acting 
and obtaining the consent of the client to such 
transaction. ... ;  (4) to engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which is 
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6.36
                                              
36 Broker-dealers are exempted from this provision of 
the Advisers Act, provided that they are not otherwise acting 
as investment advisers.  15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3).  At numerous 
places in their brief, the Investors attempt to equate MB, an 
investment adviser, with a “broker-dealer” or a “securities 
firm.”  (See Appellant’s Opening Br. at 29 n.20 (noting that 
      
59 
 
In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 
U.S. 180 (1963), the Supreme Court interpreted the antifraud 
provision of the Advisers Act as expressing Congress’s 
recognition that an investment adviser is a fiduciary with a 
duty of “utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all 
material facts, as well as an affirmative obligation to avoid 
misleading his clients.”  Id. at 194 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted);  see also id. 191 (citing 
Congressional recognition of “the delicate fiduciary nature of 
an investment advisory relationship” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); id. at 201(holding that an investment adviser 
who purchases a security for his own account and then 
                                                                                                     
the “[r]ules of the SEC and self-regulatory organizations 
provide a standard of care for the securities industry,” and 
collecting cases); id. at 38 (citing Jairett v. First Montauk 
Sec. Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 562, 572-73 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 
(“[A] broker-dealer may be held liable for failing to strictly 
supervise the acts of a registered agent ... .”)); id at 60 (citing 
Hanley v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1969) 
(“Brokers and salesmen are under a duty to investigate, and 
… cannot deliberately ignore that which [they have] a duty to 
know and recklessly state facts about matters of which [they] 
are ignorant.”)).)   However, “investment adviser” is not 
synonymous with “broker-dealer,” and the Pennsylvania 
Securities Act explicitly distinguishes broker-dealers from 
investment advisers.  See 70 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1-
102(j)(iii) (excluding broker-dealers from the definition of 
“investment adviser”).  Because “MB was never a registered 
broker-dealer, and [the Investors] have not even alleged 
otherwise”  (Centre Defendant’s Br. at 32 n.11), we decline 
the Investors’ invitation to treat it as one. 
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recommends the same security to his client without disclosing 
that ownership violates the antifraud provision of the Act and 
breaches his fiduciary duty).  The decision in Capital Gains 
Research has been interpreted as establishing a federal 
fiduciary standard for investment advisers.  See Santa Fe 
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,  472 n.11 (1977) 
(interpreting the Capital Gains Research Court’s “references 
to fraud in the ‘equitable’ sense” as “recognition that 
Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act to establish 
federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers”);  
Transam. Morg. Advisors (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 
(1979) (finding that “the [Advisers] Act’s legislative history 
leaves no doubt that Congress intended to impose enforceable 
fiduciary obligations”).   
 
Because of the federal fiduciary standard, some courts 
dealing with private causes of action alleging fiduciary breach 
by investment advisers have relied on federal, rather than 
state, common law.  See Laird v. Integrated Res., Inc., 897 
F.2d 816, 837 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The Supreme Court has 
recognized the investment advisers’ fiduciary status.  Courts 
may refer to [its] cases instead of state analogies in deciding 
whether this status prohibits particular conduct.”);  see also 
id.  (“[C]oncerning entanglement with state law, because our 
holding  encompasses a developed federal standard, it does 
not require reference to state corporate and securities law or 
the state law of fiduciary relationships.”); State ex rel. Udall 
v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 812 P.2d 777, 785 (N.M. 1991) 
(citing Capital Gains Research, and applying the standard set 
forth therein, in ruling on a state law claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty against an investment adviser); cf. Douglass v. 
Beakley, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2012 WL 5250566, *11 & n.16 
(N.D.Tex., Oct. 24, 2012) (citing Texas law for breach of 
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fiduciary duty claims, but noting that the Supreme Court in 
Transamerica recognized “that Section 206 of the IAA 
“establishes federal fiduciary standards to govern the conduct 
of investment advisers” (citing Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 
17)); but cf. In the Matter of O’Brien Partners, Inc., S.E.C. 
Release No. 7594, 88 S.E.C. Docket 615, 1998 WL 744085, 
*9 n.20 (Oct. 27, 1998) (noting that respondent “owed a 
fiduciary duty to its clients, both as a financial advisor and as 
an investment adviser[,]” and adding by footnote that “[i]n 
addition to its duties under the Advisers Act, relevant state 
law also imposed a fiduciary duty on [respondent],” with 
citations to Wisconsin and California law).  Among other 
benefits, following the federal fiduciary standard has as the 
particular virtue that, “because state law is not considered, 
uniformity is promoted.”  Laird, 897 F.2d at 837. 
 
Of course, if one looks to federal law for the statement 
of the duty and the standard to which investment advisers are 
to be held, one might reasonably wonder why the cause of 
action is presented as springing from state law, and the 
answer is straightforward: no federal cause of action is 
permitted.  With the exception of a private remedy relating to 
certain investment advisory contracts,37
                                              
37 There exists only “a limited private remedy under 
the [Advisers Act] to void an investment advisers contract” 
made in violation of the Act.  Transam. Morg. Advisors 
(TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979);  see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-15 (providing that any contract whose terms would 
violate the Advisers Act shall be void both as to parties to the 
contract and as to third parties who acquire rights under the 
contract). 
 “the [Advisers] Act 
confers no other private causes of action, legal or equitable.”  
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Transam. Morg. Advisors, 444 U.S. at 24.  That reality ought 
to call into serious question whether a limitation in federal 
law can be circumvented simply by hanging the label “state 
law” on an otherwise forbidden federal claim.38
 
  Questionable 
or not, however, that is the labeling game that has been 
played in this corner of the securities field, and the confusion 
it engenders may explain why there has been little 
development in either state or federal law on the applicable 
standards.  Half a century later, courts still look primarily to 
Capital Gains Research for a description of an investment 
adviser’s fiduciary duties.  See SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 
567 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Capital Gains Research for the 
proposition that an investment adviser is a fiduciary). 
We need not resolve whether the Investors’ fiduciary 
duty claims can properly be brought as a matter of state law 
because, even if Pennsylvania and federal law permit a 
private right of action for a breach of an investment adviser’s 
fiduciary duties, and assuming that the proper standard of 
care is the federal standard,39
                                              
38 And, in fact, the viability of a state law claim for a 
fiduciary breach by an investment adviser has been 
questioned.  See Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1142 (5th 
Cir. 1979) (“We do not think this overall purpose [of the 
Advisers Act] is a warrant to read  ... the [antifraud] sections 
... as the vehicle to reach all breaches of fiduciary trust.”). 
 the Investors have not 
39 Given the paucity of Pennsylvania law on the 
fiduciary duties owed by investment advisers, and given that 
Pennsylvania statutory law expressly follows the Advisers 
Act, we believe that, if Pennsylvania were to sanction such a 
claim, it would follow the federal standard.  Provisions of the 
Pennsylvania Securities Act (“PSA”), 70 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
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§§ 1-101 et seq., applicable to investment advisers prohibit 
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices.  See 70 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1-404 (describing “prohibited advisory 
activities”).  The PSA does not impose any affirmative duty 
to investigate investments, but merely says that an investment 
adviser may not “make any untrue statement of material fact 
or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made ... not misleading” as part of the “solicitation 
of advisory clients.”  Id.  § 1-404(b).  Pennsylvania 
regulations governing registered investment advisers require 
that they “exercise diligent supervision over the securities 
activities ... of [their] agents, investment adviser 
representatives, and employees” and require investment 
advisers to adopt internal compliance procedures similar to 
those mandated by the Advisers’ Act.  See 10 Pa. Code 
§ 305.011(a).  However, the PSA also provides that the 
requirements it imposes on investment advisers do not 
establish a standard of care that can be the basis of civil 
liability.  See 70 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1-506 (“Except  as 
explicitly provided in this act, no civil liability in favor of any 
private party shall arise against any person by implication 
from or as a result of the violation of any provision of this act 
or any rule hereunder.”); see also Cover v. Cushing Capital 
Corp., 497 A.2d 249, 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“Regulations 
adopted pursuant to the [Pennsylvania] Securities Act were 
intended to make broker-dealers responsible to the state, 
rather than to any specific person or group.  They were not 
intended to provide an absolute standard of care to be applied 
in a civil action against a broker where an agent, 
unbeknownst to the broker, engaged in a private scheme to 
defraud his friends and customers.”).  Although “broker-
dealer” is generally not synonymous with “investment 
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succeeded in stating such a claim, let alone adducing proof 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment for the reasons set 
forth below.  The federal fiduciary standard requires that an 
investment adviser act in the “best interest” of its advisory 
client.  See, e.g., SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 146 (1st Cir. 
2008) (“[15 U.S.C. § 80b-6] imposes a fiduciary duty on 
investment advisers to act at all times in the best interest of 
the fund and its investors.”).  Under the “best interest” test, an 
adviser may benefit from a transaction recommended to a 
client if, and only if, that benefit and all related details of the 
transaction are fully disclosed.  See Capital Gains Research, 
375 U.S. at 191-92.  (stating that the Advisers Act was meant 
to “eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest 
which might incline an investment adviser – consciously or 
unconsciously – to render advise which was not 
disinterested”).   In addition to the clear statutory prohibition 
on fraud, the federal fiduciary standard thus focuses on the 
avoidance or disclosure of conflicts of interest between the 
investment adviser and the advisory client.  See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.204A-1 (describing the required investment adviser 
code of ethics, and its focus on conflicts of interest); cf. 
Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. at 191-92 (discussing the 
obligations of investment advisers).40
                                                                                                     
adviser,” the regulations cited apply both to “[e]very broker-
dealer and investment adviser registered under the [PSA] ... .”  
10 Pa. Code. § 305.011(a).  Ultimately, however, even if 
Pennsylvania were to apply its own fiduciary duty standards, 
the Investors’ claims would fail.  See infra n.44. 
      
40 It has been suggested that the fiduciary duty of 
investment advisers under the federal standard goes beyond 
the avoidance of fraud and conflicts of interest.  At least one 
court has held that an investment adviser has “a duty to his 
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 Because Altman and MB had different relationships 
with various Investors – some advisory and some not – we 
                                                                                                     
clients and readers to undertake some reasonable 
investigation of the figures he [is] printing before he print[s] 
them.”  SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304, 1314 (E.D. Mich. 
1983), aff’d, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985).  The SEC has also 
proposed regulations that would expressly prohibit 
investment advisers from making “unsuitable 
recommendations to clients.”  See Suitability of Investment 
Advice Provided by Investment Advisers; Custodial Account 
Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, Advisers Act 
Release No. 1406, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,454, 13464 (Mar. 16, 
1994) (describing a proposed “suitability rule” to be 
promulgated at 17 C.F.R. 275.206(4)-5).  In addition, the SEC 
proposed a number of regulations aimed at hedge funds that 
would have, inter alia, imposed a duty “to have a reasonable 
basis for client recommendations”).  See Registration Under 
the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Advisers 
Act Release No 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72054 (Dec. 2, 
2004).  Notably, that Release was later vacated by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 882-83 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
Moreover, we find nothing in Capital Gains Research or the 
Supreme Court cases that came after it that extended the 
Court’s interpretation of the Advisers Act to encompass a 
fiduciary duty of “reasonable investigation.”  We also find 
nothing in the record to suggest that North Hills, had it been 
the successful hedge fund that Altman and MB believed it to 
be, was “unsuitable” for any of the Investors.   
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discuss the Investors’ direct fiduciary duty claims against 
each of them separately.41
 
   
1. Fiduciary Duty Claim Against Altman 
 
 The Investors appeal the District Court’s dismissal of 
their breach of fiduciary duty claim against Altman only with 
respect to Belmont and PFS, and do not appeal the dismissal 
as it may pertain to Perez and the Kellys.42
 
  The Court 
rejected the claim concerning Belmont and PFS because it 
concluded that neither of those plaintiffs had established that 
Altman was in a fiduciary relationship with them, and that 
there was no evidence of conduct on the part of Altman that 
would constitute a breach, even if such a relationship had 
existed.   
                                              
41 Because Bloom breached the federal fiduciary 
standard when he deceived the Investors as to the true nature 
of North Hills, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, our 
discussion of the imputation doctrine, supra, may arguably be 
applicable to the Investors’ claim that MB breached its 
fiduciary breach to them.  Unlike their 10b-5 and UTPCPL 
claims, however, the Investors’ fiduciary duty claim against 
MB is not one that they argue involves principles of 
imputation.  Consequently we do not address that question. 
42 The District Court concluded that the Investors had 
made “no allegation of any relationship between Altman and 
Plaintiff Perez or the Kellys, let alone a fiduciary one” (App. 
at 51), a conclusion that the Investors do not challenge in this 
appeal.   
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 The Investors argue that Altman had a fiduciary 
relationship with Belmont because Belmont was an advisory 
client of MB’s, and that Altman was a fiduciary to  PFS 
because he took on an advisory role when he met with 
Wallace, the sole principal of PFS, to discuss North Hills.  
The Investors say that Altman breached his fiduciary duty 
because he “tout[ed] North Hills and its claimed performance 
to Belmont and [PFS]” and “recommend[ed]/directed[ed] 
Belmont’s transfer of $1 million to North Hills from 
[Belmont’s] MB-managed Schwab account.”  (Appellants’ 
Opening Br. at 58.)  Those arguments fall short.  First, PFS 
was not an MB advisory client, and Altman therefore owed 
him no duty as an investment adviser.  Altman met with 
Wallace only once, in June 2006, and PFS did not invest in 
North Hills until September 2008, suggesting that, to the 
extent PFS relied at all on statements allegedly made by 
Altman, that reliance was extremely limited.  It is impossible 
to infer from the minimal contact that Wallace and Altman 
had that an investment advisory relationship was formed with 
PFS, and the District Court thus properly dismissed the PFS 
fiduciary duty claim against Altman.  
 
 Unlike PFS, Belmont did have an investment advisory 
agreement with MB, and Altman served as Belmont’s 
portfolio manager.  Also unlike PFS, Belmont invested in 
North Hills shortly after the June 2006 meeting with Altman 
and Bloom, at which they allegedly recommended such an 
investment.  For the sake of argument, then, we will accept 
the assertion that Altman had a fiduciary relationship with 
Belmont.  Even accepting that premise, however, there is no 
evidence of fraud on the part of Altman and no allegation that 
he benefitted from his recommendation that Belmont invest in 
North Hills in a manner that would constitute an undisclosed 
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conflict of interest.  The mere fact that Altman made what 
turned out to be an ill-advised recommendation to Belmont is 
not sufficient to establish a breach of fiduciary duty under the 
federal fiduciary standard.  The District Court thus did not err 
in dismissing Belmont’s fiduciary duty claim against Altman. 
 
2. Fiduciary Duty Claim Against MB by 
 PFS and Perez 
 
 The District Court granted summary judgment on the 
fiduciary duty claim of PFS and Perez against MB because 
there was no evidence of a fiduciary relationship.  However, 
Wallace and Perez argue that they “believed that North Hills 
was an investment vehicle provided by MB and, as such, 
[that] MB was their investment adviser with respect to their 
North Hills investments.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 47).   
 
 Although there may at one time have been some 
confusion on the part of Perez and PFS as to the relationship 
between North Hills and MB, there is no evidence that there 
was an advisory relationship between MB and either Perez or 
PFS pursuant to which they could claim the protection  of the 
federal fiduciary standard.  Perez and PFS invested no money 
with MB and signed no investment advisory agreement with 
MB.  Both Perez and PFS’s principal, Wallace, knew that 
they were investing in North Hills, rather than MB, and that 
Bloom was the sole portfolio manager of North Hills.  Perez 
had met Bloom in connection with a matter unrelated to MB, 
telephoned Bloom directly for investment advice, and 
invested in North Hills based on Bloom’s personal 
recommendation.  For his part, Wallace testified that he gave 
the funds that he invested in North Hills directly to Bloom 
and that he never discussed with Bloom the possibility of 
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investing that money in MB or any of its managed funds.  
Wallace further admitted that in his only conversation with 
Machinist, they discussed only funds offered by MB and not 
North Hills or anything about Bloom’s separate fund.   
 
In the absence of any investment by Perez or PFS 
through MB, or any other reason why Perez and PFS should 
have thought that MB was their investment adviser with 
respect to their North Hills investments, the District Court 
properly held that there was no fiduciary relationship that 
would support a claim by Perez and PFS for a breach of 
fiduciary duty by MB, and the Court therefore correctly 
granted summary judgment to MB on that claim. 
 
3. Fiduciary Duty Claim Against MB by  
 Belmont and the Kellys 
 
 The District Court acknowledged, and MB does not 
contest, that MB owed a fiduciary duty to Belmont and the 
Kellys based on their investment advisory agreements with 
MB.  The Investors argue that the District Court ignored 
evidence that MB had breached its fiduciary duty to Belmont 
and the Kellys by failing to uncover and disclose the North 
Hills fraud.   
 
 Applying the federal fiduciary standard to this case, 
Belmont and the Kellys have failed to prove that MB 
breached its fiduciary duty as their investment adviser.  They 
have not alleged any conflict of interest, in the context of 
MB’s limited involvement in their North Hills investments.  
And, to the extent they refer to Bloom’s fraud, it is merely to 
repeat the allegation made in the context of their other claims 
that “there was more than enough evidence – in MB’s 
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possession – from which MB should have recognized 
Bloom’s fraud.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 50.)  But, while 
MB’s failure to uncover the North Hills fraud may have been 
a “real factor” in the losses sustained by Belmont and the 
Kellys, it is not sufficient to establish that MB failed to act 
solely in their interest.43  The District Court thus did not err in 
granting summary judgment to MB on the claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty to Belmont and the Kellys.44
                                              
43 The fact that MB continued to manage investments 
for the Kellys until it ceased operations in June 2009 also 
suggests that they, at least, did not think that MB had acted in 
bad faith or under a conflict of interest in connection with 
their North Hills investments.  
 
44 Even if Pennsylvania did not follow the federal 
fiduciary standard for investment advisers, see supra note 39, 
we do not think that it would affect the disposition of the 
Investors’ direct fiduciary claims.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has said that a plaintiff  alleging a fiduciary 
breach must first demonstrate that a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship existed, see Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 
1115, 1119-22 (Pa. 2000), which requires that “one person 
has reposed a special confidence in another to the extent that 
the parties do not deal with each other on equal terms.”  In re 
Estate of Clark, 359 A.2d 777, 781 (Pa. 1976) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion 
Advertising, Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) 
(“[T]he critical question is whether the relationship goes 
beyond mere reliance on superior skill, and into a relationship 
characterized by overmastering influence on one side or 
weakness, dependence or trust, justifiably reposed on the 
other side.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
vacate in part the District Court’s dismissal order and 
                                                                                                     
None of the Investors has demonstrated a relationships 
characterized by such justifiable reliance or “overmastering 
influence.”  PFS and Perez were not clients of either Altman 
or MB, and therefore could not justifiably rely on any advice 
they received regarding North Hills.  Altman met with 
Wallace of PFS only once, in June 2006, and PFS did not 
invest in North Hills until September 2008, suggesting that 
any reliance on either Altman or MB was extremely limited.  
Perez can point to nothing more than single phone 
conversation with Bloom while he was in his office at MB.  
Because they had advisory agreements with MB, Belmont 
and the Kellys have better grounds on which to claim a 
fiduciary relationship.  However, Pennsylvania law is clear 
that a fiduciary relationship does not exist merely because one 
party receives, or even relies on advice from another, but 
rather requires that “the parties do not deal with each other on 
equal terms.”  Estate of Clarke, 359 A.2d at 781.  Nothing in 
Belmont’s or the Kellys’ relationships with Altman and MB 
suggests that they dealt on unequal terms. On the contrary, 
both Belmont and the Kellys were at all times free to reject 
any recommendation that Altman or MB may have made 
concerning a possible investment in North Hills.  Again, the 
mere fact that one takes another’s advice does not, in itself, 
demonstrate the “overmastering influence” that the law 
requires.    
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summary judgment.  We will affirm to the extent that the 
Court dismissed all of the Investors’ claims against Altman, 
granted summary judgment to all of the other defendants, 
other than MB, on all of the Investors’ claims, and granted 
summary judgment to MB on the claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty.  We will vacate the grant of summary 
judgment to MB on the claims for violations of Rule 10b-5 
and the UTPCPL, and we will remand this case for a trial 
with respect to those claims against MB. 
 
